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Abstract 
Kantian ethics is based on a metaphysical conception of autonomy that may 
seem difficult to reconcile with the empirically-based science of psychology. I 
argue that, although not formally developed, a Self-Determination Theory 
(SDT) perspective of ethics can broaden the field of Kantian-based moral 
psychology and specify what it means, motivationally, to have autonomy in the 
application of a moral norm. More specifically, I argue that this is possible 
when a moral norm is fully endorsed by the self through a process of 
internalization that is energized by intrinsic motivation and is facilitated by the 
fulfillment of the basic needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness. The 
conditions of the fulfillment of these needs may even implicitly reveal which 
norms will be integrated and treated as moral norms. I conclude that SDT 
offers a motivational approach that is useful in understanding the development 
of moral norms.   
Keywords: ethics; morality; motivation; autonomy; self-determination 
theory; Kant 
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Autonomy and morality: A Self-Determination Theory discussion of ethics 
Moral psychology is an interdisciplinary field that draws from 
psychology and philosophy equally and cannot really be approached without a 
basic understanding of both. This becomes apparent when one gets acquainted 
with the best known theory of moral psychology, that of Kohlberg (1971, 
1973). Kohlberg defined the highest form of moral development in terms of 
the theory of Immanuel Kant (1785/2011) and conceptualized it as our ability 
to author the moral rules we live by. Kant (1785/2011) saw ‘autonomy of the 
will’ as the foundation for authoring our own rules and famously argued that 
ethical principles should not be derived from human inclination: What we 
ought to do should not stem from what we want to do. Our needs, our 
emotions, our intuitions should be sacrificed in favor of objective criteria such 
as the categorical imperative, that is, acting consistently with a rule that we 
would treat as a universal law. This ability entails a high level of freedom from 
environmental contingencies as well as self-serving predispositions. Under this 
perspective, neither rewards nor conventional rules can be the basis of 
morality. It is through our own reasoning that we transcend our own bodies, 
author rules as universal laws and achieve the highest level of morality.  
Kant’s theory leaves little room for psychology, since his view is based 
on a metaphysical conception of will and duty that have no empirical 
antecedents (Campbell & Christopher, 1996). Any type of empirical cause 
would undermine the autonomy of the will and would taint the moral character 
of an act. It is not easy to take his theory and apply it as a guide for 
approaching moral behavior in the real, empirical world. This may be one of 
the most important reasons for why Kohlberg’s approach seems rationalistic: it 
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depends too much on the abstract interpretative scheme of Kantian reasoning 
and on a hierarchically ordered sequence of moral cognitive structures that are 
more logically than psychologically related to each other. This fact may also 
account for why his perspective is no longer dominant. More recent 
approaches incorporate factors besides rational reasoning in their analyses, 
such as emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2001), skills (Churchland, 
1998), virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and intuitions (Haidt, 2001). 
Scientists are exploring new ground and including affective or personality 
processes, but also societal and cultural influences, in order to explain moral 
judgment. Of course, some approaches rely mainly on social processes (e.g., 
Ellemers & Bos, 2012) whereas others may rely on biological factors, such as 
brain structure (Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005). 
Even though Kant’s theory of freedom has received considerable 
criticism --even within philosophy--, it does make a strong, simple point that is 
easily, intuitively understood: If my reasons for performing a seemingly moral 
act illustrate contingencies beyond the act itself, that act should not be 
considered moral. For moral psychology the next question to ask is how we 
can discuss this type of autonomous behavior without stripping individuals of 
their brains, their emotions, their skills, their goals. In other words, without 
ignoring their organisms. 
A potential answer may lie with a motivational theory called Self-
Determination Theory (SDT), which examines the reasons why people perform 
any type of activity and places great importance on autonomy. Autonomy is 
defined as regulation by the self (Ryan & Deci, 2006) and is distinguished 
from heteronomy, that is, regulation by forces outside the self. One of the most 
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important aspects that SDT can bring into the discussion of moral psychology 
is that it also distinguishes autonomy from independence (Ryan, 1993), 
meaning that it defines autonomous acts not in terms of the pure absence of 
contingencies but in terms of a person’s endorsement of the act itself. The 
question I will ponder on is whether true endorsement of a moral act, even in 
the presence of contingencies, succeeds in the maintenance of the character of 
the Kantian moral act. In this endeavor, I will focus on autonomy and the 
concept of internalization, discuss SDT’s relation to other theories, and argue 
that the integration of ethical rules is the basis of true, autonomous morality. 
A motivational account of ethics 
A motivational approach would focus on why an individual is 
energized or activated toward a particular end or, in the case of morality, why a 
person is energized toward ethically appropriate behavior. Motivation is 
closely related to the notion of energy, discussed in the classic theories of 
Freud (1962) and Hull (1943) and relating to the notions of instincts and 
drives. Especially after the advent of behaviorism, these theories declined in 
significance because of their inability to account for normal development 
(within Freudian theory) and to account for exploratory and interest-based 
behaviors (within Hullian theory). In response to the decline of motivation as a 
topic for research, White (1959) shifted the focus from the concepts of instincts 
and drives to independent ego energy and intrinsic motivation. He argued that 
exploration, playful behavior, and the production of effective changes in the 
environment exhibit direction, selectivity and persistence in a way that the 
actions seem motivating in their own right. Moreover, these aspects of 
behavior can only be conceived in relation to the stimulus field that an 
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individual would aspire to “conquer” and, therefore, concentration on 
cognition and emotion alone, as is often the case, cannot fully account for 
human behavior. Similarly, it can be argued that morality should not be sought 
in isolated aspects of human behavior –-such as rational reasoning or 
emotions-- but should take into consideration a broader conception of behavior 
that takes into account these inherent motivational tendencies. 
  Self-Determination Theory relies on a quite similar premise to 
White’s (1959) propositions: individuals exhibit intrinsic motivation as the 
manifestation of the built-in energy of the organism to seek and conquer 
optimal challenges (Deci & Ryan, 1985). An SDT view of ethics will therefore 
attempt a more holistic psychological account of ethical behavior since it does 
not emphasize isolated elements of the person or the environment but the 
interplay between the two. On the one hand there is the environment, aspects 
of which often seek to control behavior, and on the other hand there is the 
organism, seeking to expand and conquer aspects of the environment. Self-
Determination Theory accepts that the environment can control behavior but 
also that individual decisions can be causal elements in behavior. In this 
interaction, it is the will that energizes support for individual decisions and 
allows a person to counteract forces from the environment (Deci, 1980).  In 
fact, the notions of will and autonomy are central elements in Self-
Determination Theory, just as they are in Kant’s account of morality. With 
regard to morality, an SDT account would especially focus on exploring when 
the will energizes support for ethical decisions.   
The act, the self, contingencies and autonomy 
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In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1785/2011) argued 
that the good will is not defined as good by what it accomplishes; it is good in 
itself. It is not defined, for example, by the fact that it may guide actions that 
contribute to the happiness of others. It is not defined by any sort of 
inclinations or natural laws either. In fact, the “good” will is not defined by 
anything other than reason. The “good” will is purely autonomous, free from 
contingencies and inclinations, and will abide by rules out of duty alone. Duty 
is a central element of Kantian ethics and refers to the objective necessity of an 
action from obligation. Of course, scientists struggle with such a metaphysical 
account of duty and will. 
For an empirical science, such as psychology, it is indeed difficult to 
accept that the so-called noumenal will, having no connection to the empirical 
world, can actually cause behavior (Campbell & Christopher, 1996). Kant’s 
concept of transcendental freedom goes beyond the organism and any 
contingencies of the empirical world into the realm of reason where the person 
can truly be free. This is the field where moral norms are produced according 
to Kant, who evidently wants to disengage the production of moral laws from 
any sort of environmental influence. Any type of duty should arise 
autonomously, free from contingencies. From a psychological perspective, I 
will try to account for how an organism can act out of duty while minimizing 
any sort of contingencies. In this sense, I offer a Kantian-based psychological 
account of ethics without accepting its metaphysical underpinnings. 
Self-Determination Theory argues that an autonomous act is defined as 
regulation by the self, the self being a central process that regulates behavior 
and experience. It is an organismic theory that accepts that humans have a 
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natural propensity to grow and assimilate aspects of their environment. 
Behavior is essentially the product of the interaction between the organism and 
the environment. A self-determined, autonomous act is an act that is regulated 
by the phenomenal ego-center (Pfander, 1908/1967), whereas a heteronomous 
act is mainly caused by external influences such as environmental controls or 
even inner impulses that are experienced as controlling urges that are not 
endorsed by the phenomenal ego-center or self. It is not the absence of controls 
that makes an action autonomous but full endorsement of an act by the self, 
even it is in accord with an external demand (Ryan & Deci, 2006). Within 
SDT, there is a concept that reflects the perceived autonomy that the self 
experiences in the performance of an act: The Perceived Locus of Causality 
(PLOC- Ryan & Connell, 1989; cf. Heider, 1958). Acts with an internal PLOC 
are acts in which a person feels as the origin of the behavior whereas acts with 
an external PLOC are acts in which the person feels as a pawn (cf. De Charms, 
1968). Autonomous acts are therefore those acts during which the person feels 
as the “owner” of the behavior, even if they are in line with external demands. 
Extending this reasoning to the field of moral psychology, autonomous moral 
acts would be moral acts in which the individual perceives oneself as the origin 
of behavior, irrespective of the existence of environmental controls and inner 
impulses. 
The prototype of an autonomous act is an intrinsically motivated 
activity where a person performs the activity for the sake of the activity itself 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). In this case, there is no “ought” prevalent in the 
situation, no external constraints, but only wants and inclinations--such as 
curiosity, exploratory or playful tendencies--that are satisfied during the act. 
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Intrinsic motivation is the primary energizing force within the organism that 
strives for the engagement in one’s interests and the exercise of one’s 
capacities (Deci & Ryan, 1985). It exists within the individual--and not 
necessarily only in humans--although it is understandable that the focus can 
also be on inherently interesting properties of an activity (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
By Kantian standards, intrinsically motivated behavior cannot be considered 
moral because the main connection between the activity and the self is an 
inclination and not a sense of duty. No act that appears to satisfy inclinations 
can be considered the basis of a moral norm.  
Indeed, what we are in search of is an extrinsic connection between the 
activity and the self that takes the form of a moral norm, imposes a certain 
sense of “ought” but does not appear to embody any contingencies that 
transcend the activity itself.  Although the prerequisite of the existence of an 
“ought” standard excludes the possibility that a moral act can be an 
intrinsically motivated act, the autonomy component of intrinsically motivated 
behavior is a sought after property for true moral behavior because there is no 
instrumentality, there are no external contingencies guiding behavior. This is 
the type of Kantian autonomous property that we are searching for in a moral 
act: Although the act itself is not the purpose, there are no contingencies 
present in the individual’s motivation. The primary motivation of a moral act 
should therefore exist within the person’s will to proceed with the act and 
should not be grounded in any type of contingencies, even if they are 
objectively present in the situation.  
Let us take the example of a person diving into the water in order to 
help a man who is drowning reach the shore. If the person is a competitive 
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swimmer and jumps into the water only because he loves how the cold water 
feels and enjoys performing under challenging circumstances, then the activity 
can be described as intrinsically motivating because the act itself is the 
purpose. It is motivated by inclinations, exploratory and playful tendencies. If 
the purpose, however, is to save the man’s life, then this act is not intrinsically 
motivated. On the contrary, it is extrinsically motivated because it serves a 
different purpose than the performance of the act itself. In other words, it is a 
means to an end. Moreover, if the act does not appear to serve a higher ideal, a 
moral norm, it is doubtful that the act will be described as moral. However, not 
all extrinsically motivated acts that appear to comply with a moral norm will 
be treated as moral. According to Kant, they should be autonomous. Therefore, 
under a Kantian-based view of ethics, the nature of the reasons for the moral 
act should also be examined. 
According to SDT, there are four types of extrinsic motivation (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000): External regulation, where the act is performed for the attainment 
of certain rewards or the avoidance of certain punishments; introjected 
regulation, where the act is performed in order to protect or boost one’s own 
self-esteem, avoid guilt or feel pride; identified regulation, where a person 
realizes the significance and value of the act; integrated regulation, where the 
act is fully in tune and consistent with the totality of a person’s identifications 
and value system. To refer back to the previous example, if there was a high 
reward to save a man’s life and this was the reason why the person dove into 
the water, the rescue would be classified as an externally regulated act. If the 
person dove into the water to prove to himself how brave he is, it would be 
classified under introjected regulation. If the person dove into the water on the 
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belief that every human life is valuable, this act would be classified under 
identified regulation. Finally, if the person dove into the water despite the 
realization that his life would be jeopardized and his loved ones distressed, 
taking into account all relevant factors but still endorsing the principle of what 
he ought to do in this kind of situation, the act of diving into the water would 
be classified as integrated regulation.  
The more the extrinsic properties of the situation appear close to the 
fundamental phenomenal core of the person we call the self, the more the 
reasons for performing an activity are difficult to dissociate from the self or the 
activity itself. Contingencies may be objectively present, but they do not define 
the person’s motives for performing the act. With regard to the previous 
example of the dangerous endeavor of trying to save a person’s life, even the 
morality of an identified regulated act might be brought into question if the 
prospective rescuer entirely neglected to think about his own children. This 
thought could reverse his decision by making the possible effect on the 
children’s happiness salient, in case something went dreadfully wrong. On the 
other hand, an integrated regulated act already incorporates the consideration 
of similar contingencies, by bringing all identifications in harmony with the 
person’s unified sense of self—through the process of internalization and its 
last stage, integration, which will be analyzed further--. This is why integrated 
regulation seems to be very close to intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000): 
It is so natural an extension of the self that all contingencies are absorbed into 
the person’s unified sense of self. This is also why external regulation and 
introjection are considered heteronomous types of motivation whereas 
regulation through identification and, more so, integrated regulation are 
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considered more autonomous types of motivation. Finally, this is why under 
Kantian ethical standards we would treat an integrated regulated act which is 
consistent with a moral norm, as a true moral act: It is in line with a moral 
norm while at the same time, any present contingencies do not define the 
person’s act. The act is a natural extension of the unified sense of self.  
The internalization of moral norms 
It is difficult to imagine how acts can become natural extensions of the self. 
The move from external regulation to integrated regulation is a complicated 
process that is called internalization. According to SDT, internalization is 
propelled by intrinsic motivation, the active process of pursuing one’s own 
propensities and developing one’s own capacities (Deci & Ryan, 1985).  It is 
not a passive one-way process directed from the environment to the organism 
but an active accommodation of the environment by the organism. Therefore, 
the process of moral development, that is, the move toward integrated moral 
norms, is driven by the fundamental aspects of intrinsic motivation. I should 
note here that researchers in SDT have not explicitly studied the development 
of moral norms; they have studied behavior in general. I will, however, use 
relevant research and make predictions concerning moral norms. At the same 
time, I have to acknowledge that these predictions should be tested by 
empirical research, as SDT is an empirically-based theory.  
Self-Determination Theory argues that there are three basic 
psychological needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy that display the 
deep structure of human psyche and reflect the basic tendencies for 
effectiveness, connectedness and coherence (Deci & Ryan, 2000). These basic 
needs reflect the energizing force of the organism and can provide a roadmap 
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of how moral norms can be integrated. As long as these needs are not thwarted, 
SDT argues that internalization of regulations and values will be a natural 
process for the healthy functioning organism. 
 Regulations and values are more easily internalized when the 
environment provides the nutrients for the support of the needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000). From the autonomy side, an 
environment where contingencies are not prevalent will help individuals 
actively seek and internalize the moral norms that express their natural 
tendencies. This is possible when rewards are not salient and guilt or anxiety 
fostered by circumstances such as ego-involvement (Ryan, 1982) is avoided. 
From the competence side, the existence of ethical challenges that a person can 
successfully live up to--in contrast to ethical challenges that a person will find 
extremely difficult to fulfill--will bring out moral norms that will be more 
easily internalized. Finally, from the relatedness side, an environment where a 
person has the ability to connect to others and socialize will foster the 
internalization of relevant moral norms.  
As a general rule, an environment promotes a self-determined adoption 
of a moral norm that appears in the social context through the existence of low 
contingencies, optimal challenges and the chance to connect to others. Deci, 
Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone (1994) elaborate especially on the processes of 
integration—which could be considered as the last step of internalization--and 
provide a framework that seems pertinent to the integration of moral norms. It 
would not be a big leap to generalize their research into the realm of moral 
development and argue that three contextual events will allow integration: (a) 
providing a meaningful rationale that will help a person understand the 
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significance of a moral norm (b) acknowledging the feelings of conflict 
between an inclination and the fulfillment of the moral norm, (c) conveying 
choice so that the person will be allowed to take responsibility. 
 The concept of moral internalization is also present in the classic work 
of Freud and Piaget. Freud uses concepts such as introjection (Freud, 1924) or 
identification (Bronfenbrenner, 1960)--defined differently within SDT--but 
focuses on the role of the parent and sexual instincts as the primary energizing 
force of internalization. Morality is restricted to the superego and is in constant 
opposition with the id, reflecting the aforementioned conflict between 
inclination and morality. The solution to this conflict resides in the synthetic 
function of the ego (Freud, 1962).  On the other hand, for Piaget, two types of 
morality exist: A heteronomous type of morality of constraint that imposes a 
sense of duty, characterized by unilateral respect toward authority figures, and 
an autonomous type of morality, based on reciprocity and justice (Piaget, 
1948). According to Piaget, socialization and cognitive development will favor 
the autonomous type of morality.  
According to SDT, though, the move toward more autonomous, 
contingent-free morality constitutes a move from externally regulated or 
introjected moral acts, which are associated with rewards and punishment, to 
moral acts that are supported by integrated regulation. This move is made 
possible by the intrinsically motivated process of an organism toward self-
determination.  In contrast to Freud, SDT does not focus on instincts as the 
primary energizing force of internalization whereas in contrast to Piaget, it 
offers no assurance that a person will in fact move toward integrated forms of 
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morality. The process of internalization is based on the support of the basic 
psychological needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness. 
 Self-Determination Theory should also be compared with Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral development. Kohlberg opposes internalization theories 
because they seem to focus on relativistic cultural conceptions of morality 
rather than universal principles of moral development (Kohlberg, 1971). 
However, this opposition is not very strict and there may be ground for the 
reconciliation of his theory with theories that focus on society and affect 
(Gibbs, 2003; Gibbs & Schnell, 1985). Kohlberg focuses on a structured 
sequential set of six stages that the individual reaches through the development 
of logic and reasoning. The stages are divided in three main levels: 
Preconventional, conventional, postconventional. The preconventional level 
focuses mostly on rewards and punishments, in a similar vein to SDT’s 
external regulation. The conventional level is derived from the power of 
conventions to impose authority and conformity which SDT would mostly 
classify under introjected regulation. The postconventional stage, which 
Kohlberg treats as autonomous, reflects an effort to abstract from specific 
contexts and create broader, even universal, principles. This postconventional 
stage is similar to SDT’s integration level.  
Despite some similarities, there are major differences between the two 
theories, the most important of which concern how people move from one 
stage to the next. Kohlberg argues that every level reflects a general moral 
state of the person that concerns all moral behaviors and regulations and can 
only be achieved step-by-step; SDT treats every regulation and behavior 
separately and situations are not treated uniformly according to some type of 
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general moral level. According to SDT, it is possible for one behavior to be 
externally regulated and a similar one to be regulated through identification.  
Moreover, Kohlberg’s theory is based on an individual sequential development 
of reasoning whereas SDT is based on the internalization process that reflects 
the interaction between individual and environment. It is not therefore driven 
by simple cognitive development but by intrinsic motivation and the 
environment’s support or thwarting of psychological needs. 
Integration and moral relativity 
According to SDT, a person is free--or not--in the empirical world 
during the person’s interaction with the environment. The point of 
convergence between SDT and Kantian-based ethics concerns the freedom 
from contingencies during the adoption of a moral norm. I have argued so far 
that freedom from contingencies is motivationally possible only on the level of 
integrated regulation.  
 The main question that arises concerns the universal or relational 
character of the norms that are integrated. Does the fact that people have their 
own personal and often different inherent tendencies mean that the intrinsically 
motivated process of integration would produce moral norms that are tailored 
to the individual? If so, SDT is a long way from Kantian morality because the 
latter focuses on universal moral norms.  However, the fact that psychological 
needs seem to exist cross-culturally (Chirkov, 2009; Chirkov,  Ryan, & 
Willness, 2005) suggests that the procedure of internalization is the same 
universally. If the procedure is the same universally, maybe the content of 
morality will exhibit some basic, universal attributes.  
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 A philosophical theory that has expanded Kantian ethics and also 
focuses on a certain procedure--that of moral argumentation--is Habermas’s 
theory of discourse ethics (Habermas, 1991). Habermas’s discourse ethics 
continues a tradition of theories that focus on the procedure through which 
moral norms are formed. Other famous theories include Rawls’s “original 
position” where parties determine the fairness of a situation behind a “veil of 
ignorance” (Rawls, 1971) and Mead’s concept of ideal role-taking (Mead, 
1934). Habermas (1991) argues that unless people participate in interpersonal 
relations, they are unable to form their identity. This is why, intuitively, both 
the individual and society should be protected at the same time. The ideas of 
justice--as the equal respect of individual rights-- and solidarity--that 
postulates empathy and concern for one’s neighbor—reflect the 
interdependence between individuals and their community.  Habermas argues 
that these basic ideas are inherent in the relations of symmetry and reciprocity 
that are presupposed in his theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1985) 
and arise during communication. The emphasis of his moral philosophical 
approach is on the procedure of development of moral norms rather than 
identification of their content and Habermas concedes that the latter is the 
object of study for the historical and social sciences.  
An SDT-based psychological process of internalization may also 
provide a procedural account of the development of moral norms while, at the 
same time, offering the ground for the study of the content of moral norms. 
The mechanics of organismic integration and its underpinnings can offer us 
some basic principles for the type of moral norms that will be integrated: It 
will simply be those norms that facilitate the psychological process of 
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integration. If a society is structured around ideas that provide the necessary 
nutrients for the psychological process of integration, it is likely that the ideas 
themselves will be integrated. In fact, the ideas of justice and solidarity are 
likely, indeed, to facilitate integration since justice protects the needs of 
competence and autonomy whereas solidarity protects the need for relatedness. 
If environmental moral norms respect the individual and protect the web of 
interpersonal relationships, the needs for autonomy, competence and 
relatedness are likely to be supported also. It is then expected that aspects of 
the environment, including the very principles around which the environment 
is built, will be internalized, or even integrated. In a similar manner to 
Habermas (1991), SDT may predict that the principles of justice and solidarity 
are closely related to the process of moral development. In this case, however, 
the emphasis is not socio-structural but psychological.  
In order, though, to fully examine which specific moral norms will 
prevail, we need to understand which moral norms, if incorporated into the 
very structure of the environment, are likely to result in the fulfillment of 
psychological needs and are therefore expected to be integrated more easily. 
Although I have argued that the basic form of these moral norms will be 
similar to the nature of moral norms proposed by philosophical theories, I 
should stress that psychological research treats these philosophical theories as 
useful material for the production of hypotheses. It will be the objective of 
future empirical research to examine the exact nature of the moral norms that 
will facilitate the fulfillment of psychological needs and will foster integration. 
This can be a new and exciting field for empirical psychological research. 
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 On a last note, an important question to ask concerns the heterogeneity 
of moral norms found across different societies, moral norms as diverse as 
those of “Nazis and Quakers, head-hunters and Jains” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 
p.55).  According to SDT, some social norms do not facilitate integration and 
will only be maintained under the presence of rewards, the threat of 
punishments or the introjected power to protect and enhance self-esteem. 
These social norms cannot be considered as true moral norms because they are 
heteronomously maintained on the basis of particular contingencies. Social 
norms of this kind may even point to violence or crime. Ryan and Deci (2017, 
p.641) argue that “malevolent crimes and social practices that harm innocent 
parties are, in fact, not typically autonomously motivated or motivated through 
integrated regulations, as would be required definitionally for acting with 
virtue or morality”. On the other hand, some social norms will facilitate 
integration and will be endorsed by individuals autonomously: These are the 
norms that have the potential to create the context for psychological need 
fulfillment and will be celebrated as true moral norms. A formal development 
of a motivational theory of ethics will allow us to evaluate and understand not 
only the effect of moral norms on the individual, but also the morality of 
ideologies and the resultant regimes. Self-Determination Theory, an 
empirically based theory that particularly emphasizes the need for autonomy, 
seems well positioned to support this task.   
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